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UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EXPERIENCE
Joseph A. Post*
INTRODUCTION

A key focus of attention in debates over the information superhighway or "National Information Infrastructure" ("NII") is the question
of universal service;5 6 that is, the question of what role, if any, federal
and state government agencies should play in assuring that the benefits of the NII are available to as wide a segment of the population as
possible. A number of specific questions are included under the general rubric of universal service, including the following:
" What specific components of the NII should be brought within a
special universal service policy framework? Need all the capabilities and functions of the NII be accessible to everyone, regardless
of cost, or should the concept of universal availability only apply
to a "core" set of capabilities and functions? If the latter, what
criteria should be used in deciding what capabilities and functions
are in this core?
" Once a decision is made to make some minimum level of NII
resources (e.g., bandwidth) universally available, should similar
treatment be given to any or all of the services that would be
delivered over the NII? Do video games deserve the same solicitude as public library access or distance learning or medical care
delivery systems? Where on the spectrum do topical electronic
bulletin boards and chat lines fall?
" If public policy concerns are deemed to require the penetration of
NII capabilities and services in areas beyond those that would be
served by a free market, what steps should government take?
Should companies deriving revenues from the NII (either as providers of parts of the network itself or as providers of services offered on such network) be required to assume an obligation to
serve even unprofitable areas? Should the cost of serving such
areas be spread among all NII service providers through the creation of a universal service fund? If so, how should the funds be
collected and disbursed? Should the cost be spread broadly
through society by some form of taxation?
* How will the structure of the NII "market" affect universal availability? To what extent should governments be involved in the
construction, financing, ownership, or operation of NII facilities
* The author represented New York Telephone Company in proceedings before
the New York State Public Service Commission relating to some of the subjects dis-

cussed herein. Any views expressed in this discussion are, of course, the author's
own.

506. "Universal service" is a regulatory concept that holds that certain services are
so important that they should be made universally available. If necessary, such availability should be ensured through appropriate governmental action.
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or services? To what extent should private entities be involved?

Should there be any restrictions on entry into or exit from this
new "market"? Should there be a government-sanctioned monopoly, duopoly, or oligopoly; or does public policy require letting a thousand flowers bloom?
" To the extent multiple entities are involved in the construction
and operation of the NI, how can workable interconnection between the various participants be assured?
" What does it take to make NII services and capabilities "avail-

able" (beyond the physical existence of the necessary facilities in
a particular area)? What factors would prevent the use of physically available facilities by particular individuals or groups, and
what, if anything, should be done to overcome those barriers? 507
What role do language barriers, disabilities, and cultural factors
play? Who should pay the cost of such ameliorative measures?
" If it is deemed important to make some services and capabilities
universally available, how should they be priced? Should special
(i.e., below market) pricing be available to everyone for certain
services, or should such pricing only be available to the truly
needy?

To some extent, these questions are identical to public policy issues
that arise perennially in a wide variety of contexts.s
I.

AN

OVERVIEW OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION

Despite the generality of the fundamental issues that are involved,
any meaningful consideration of universal service in the NI context
must be informed by an understanding of the facilities that will make
up the NI, the services that will be provided over it, the private and/
or public entities that will be providing those facilities and services,
and the nature of existing laws and regulations affecting those entities.
As a first step in this direction, this section of the Report undertakes a
brief overview of regulation in the telecommunications industry, and
shows how the issue of universal service has been addressed in the
industry. It is hoped that this overview will provide a preliminary, if
507. Indeed, is the concept of a "barrier" even appropriate? Isn't it possible that
some people actually prefer books to video screens, and face-to-face meetings to Internet chat lines? If so, is it really appropriate to expend public funds to encourage
such people to change their preferences?
508. For example, these questions overlap with questions commonly asked concerning health care, such as: Should universal health care be guaranteed? If so, what
forms of "health care" should be deemed to fall within the guarantee, and how and by
whom should they be provided? Should health insurance be provided by private enterprise or by government, and if by private enterprise what if any regulation of prices
and availability would be appropriate? Should dense urban areas be required to subsidize the provision of postal service to remote rural areas? Should social security be
provided to everyone above a certain age, or only to those in need? To the extent a
particular activity is deemed worthy of a public subsidy, how should the subsidy be
collected? How should it be distributed?

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

incomplete, framework5" 9 for evaluating universal service issues in the
NII context.
A.

The TraditionalModel

Throughout much of the twentieth century, telecommunications
services in the United States have been provided by regulated monopolies. The dominant provider-known informally as the Bell System-provided local telephone service, long distance service, and
telephone equipment to almost the entire United States. The monopoly was considered to be a "natural" one; as one recent treatise states,
"The high cost of fixed plant, the steadily declining average cost of
service, and the need for all customers to interconnect with one another made it seem both sensible and inevitable to have a single monopoly provider." '
Such a monopoly market was associated with a regulatory environment which both protected the monopoly and constrained its conduct:
The old regulatory paradigm had three basic pillars. First, the protected franchise: would-be competitors were barred from competing
or even interconnecting with the enfranchised carrier; natural monopoly thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Second, the quarantine: the monopolist was restricted to its regulated sphere and
barred from exporting its expertise (and the corrosive influence of
its monopoly) into adjacent competitive markets. Third, cradle-tograve regulation: prices, terms, and conditions of the monopolist's
services had to be sold to regulators before they could be sold to
customers. 511

The Bell System was regulated both by the federal government 512
and state regulatory authorities. As a result of a political compromise
embodied in the federal Communications Act of 1934, 5' 3 federal regu509. Of course, the NII, in whatever form it ultimately manifests itself, will be an

outgrowth of many existing industries, including entertainment, information processing, and consumer electronics. Nevertheless, the concept at the core of the NII is the

delivery of information (in audio, video, data, and other formats) from one location to

another, and thus the communications industry would be expected to play a significant role.
Although universal service has been somewhat less of a concern in the cable television area than in telecommunications, universal service-type concerns are reflected in
some provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-549,
98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 47
U.S.C., & 50 U.S.C.), as amended by Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). No attempt is made in this
section of the Report to discuss either cable television regulation in general, or the
application of universal service concepts to the cable television industry.
510. Michael K. Kellogg et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 1.1, at 1 (1992).
511. Id. at 1-2.
512. The Interstate Commerce Commission and, after 1934, the Federal Communications Commission.
513. 47 U.S.C. § 151-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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lation is, for the most part, limited to interstate communications, and
state regulation is limited to intrastate communications.5 14 The dividing line between the two jurisdictional spheres is hardly clear, and litigation over the precise scope of515federal and state authority in
particular areas has been frequent.
The predominant framework for regulating the rates (prices)
charged by the Bell System was the traditional utility model of "rate
of return" regulation, in which a utility is allowed to set its prices at a
level sufficient to recover its expenses plus a "reasonable return" on
its investor-supplied capital. This model only determined the overall
"revenue requirement" of the utility; the question remained of allocating that requirement over the prices for specific services. The rate
structures designed by telephone companies and regulators in the monopoly era were characterized by unnaturally low rates for some services and unnaturally high rates for others. The most important
example was the maintenance of low prices for "residential exchange
access" service, that is, the basic hookup between the residential customer and the telephone company, for which the customer paid a
fixed monthly charge. 16 Telephone companies were able to maintain
such low rates, and at the same time meet their overall revenue requirement, by charging higher rates for certain services, particularly
long-distance and business services.517 Although such rate structures
resulted in prices that may have been inefficient in the technical,
microeconomic sense, they probably did help to foster universal service by keeping the price of basic telephone service low. Indeed, according to March 1994 Census Bureau figures, 93.9% of the
households in the United States have a telephone. 18

514. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(a), (b) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993); Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1986).
515. Kellogg, supra note 510, at 104-12.
516. The existence and exact amount of the "subsidy" for residential exchange access service has been a matter of intense dispute over the years. The dispute has
mainly focused on how the "cost" of a telecommunications service should appropriately be measured.
517. Similar issues are raised by other services as well. Most telephone companies
offer some form of discounted "Lifeline" service for low-income customers, generally
at rates significantly below the normal residential exchange access rate. Emergency
911 service and Telecommunications Relay Service for the hearing-impaired are often
offered on a below-cost basis. High cost rural areas have benefited from regulatory
policies which mandate uniform rates for certain services, regardless of the cost of
providing the service.
518. Alexander Belinfante, Federal Communications Commission, Telephone Subscribership in the United States 3, 6 (1994). According to the same report, 94.5% of
the individuals in the adult civilian noninstitutionalized population have a telephone
in their household. Id. at 28.
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The Rise of Competition and Its Impact on Regulation
1. Background

As technology evolved, it became clear that at least some discrete
aspects of the nationwide telephone system were not natural monopolies, and could support economic competition. Early initiatives, both
in private antitrust suits and in regulatory proceedings, opened up to
competition the market for consumer premises equipment (e.g., telephone sets and accessories) and, at least to some extent, the market
for long distance services.
A watershed came in November, 1974, when the federal government filed an antitrust suit against the Bell System. The case went to
trial in 1981, premised on the notion that the Bell System had unlawfully leveraged its monopoly on local telephone service into potentially competitive areas such as long distance service and equipment
manufacturing. After the Government concluded its case, the court
denied a defense motion to dismiss and the case was settled by entry
of a consent decree, known in its current form as the "Modification of
Final Judgment" ("MFJ"),
which essentially provided for the breakup
5 19
of the Bell System.
Under the consent decree, AT&T-the formal corporate embodiment of the Bell System-was required to divest itself of those subsidiaries that provided local exchange telephone service. The basic
theory of the decree was to separate local telephone operations, generally still considered as something of a natural monopoly, from
AT&T's potentially competitive lines of business. Thus, "leveraging"
of market power from one line of business into another would be prevented. The divested subsidiaries organized themselves into a number
of regional holding companies known as "Regional Bell Operating
Companies" ("RBOCs"). For example, New York Telephone, which
provides local telephone service in much of New York State, and New
England Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, which provides such
service in a number of New England states, became subsidiaries of a
new entity known as NYNEX Corporation. AT&T, meanwhile, retained control of its former long distance and equipment manufacturing businesses.
Among the key provisions of the decree were ones prohibiting the
RBOCs from entering into certain lines of business, such as information services, equipment manufacturing, and the provision of "interexchange" services. 520 The purpose of those provisions was to prevent
the RBOCs from leveraging their market power in the local services
market into the proscribed lines of business. Some of the line of business restrictions-particularly the prohibition on the offering of "in519. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).

520. For a further discussion of interexchange services, see infra text accompanying
notes 522-23.
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formation services"-have since been lifted z2' although the
restrictions on manufacturing and interexchange services remain.
The interexchange prohibition is essentially focused on keeping
RBOCs out of the long distance business. To give the notion of long
distance service more definite content, the nation was divided into
more than 150 "Local Access and Transport Areas" ("LATAs").5=
The RBOCs were forbidden by the MFJ from offering "interLATA"
services; essentially, services that entail the transport of communications across LATA boundaries. To promote competition between
long distance carriers (referred to in industry jargon as "interexchange
carriers" ("IXCs")), RBOCs were required to provide exchange access service to all IXCs on the same terms and conditions as those
they applied to AT&T.511
The years following divestiture have seen an explosion in telecommunications technology. Technological advances-including digital
switching, increased "intelligence" in terminal equipment, and fiber
optics-have made it even more economical for competitors to challenge the incumbent local telephone companies' supposed "natural"
monopolies. Further, the formerly separate technologies of telephony, wireless communication, and video services have been converging. Voice communications can be carried by radio signals as easily as
by wires; and video and data communications can be carried through
the same facilities as voice traffic. The result of these technological
developments has been furious activity by cable television companies,
wireless companies, long distance carriers, and others eager to enter
the telephone companies' "traditional" markets. In many cases, potential entrants have sought to expand their capabilities through strategic alliances, such as the recent consolidation of AT&T and McCaw,
a provider of wireless services.
In many states, and in the federal jurisdiction, regulators have actively encouraged competitive entry by eliminating existing regulatory
521. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308,327 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd,
993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 487 (1993).
522. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993-94 nn.9-10
(D.D.C. 1983).
523. IXCs generally do not have facilities running to individual telephone customers. Instead, they carry calls between "points of presence" that they establish in each
state. Transport of long distance calls between the calling or called party and the
point of presence is provided by local telephone companies (e.g., RBOCs) through
what the MFJ refers to as "exchange access" service. Thus, a long distance call from
New York City to Chicago might be carried by New York Telephone Company to an
MCI point of presence; MCI would then transport the call to an MCI point of presence in Chicago; it would be carried by Ameritech (the RBOC providing service in
Illinois) to the called party.
In recent years, this model has broken down to some extent; IXCs now frequently
bypass local telephone facilities by establishing direct connections between their
points of presence and their larger business customers.
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barriers.5" 4 The following briefly discusses some of the areas where
competition has emerged in recent years.
2.

IntraLATA Calling

Many states have authorized IXCs and others to offer intraLATA
525
calling services in competition with local telephone companies.
Once intraLATA competition was authorized, questions frequently
arose concerning dialing arrangements. Even in states where intraLATA competition exists, an intraLATA call dialed in the "normal" way (e.g., by dialing a seven-digit number, an eight-digit 1-xxxxxxx number, or an eleven-digit 1-xxx-xxx-xxxx number) will be carried by the local telephone company. To use an alternative carrier,
the caller must dial that carrier's access code. 6 Some states, such as
New York, have ordered local telephone companies to implement "intraLATA presubscription," under which the customer would be able
to pre-select a specific carrier as the default carrier of the customer's
intraLATA toll calls.5 27
3.

Carrier Access Services

As noted above, local telephone companies provide connections between calling or called parties and the "points of presence" of longdistance carriers. Such service is known as "exchange access" in the
MFJ, and is more commonly referred to as (switched) carrier access
service. Companies known as "CAPs," or competitive access providers, have begun to offer competitive alternatives to RBOC-provided
carrier access. For example, CAPs such as Teleport and MFS offer
"local transport" service, providing alternative connections between a
local telephone company's switching office and an IXC's point of presence. The offering of such services by CAPs has been facilitated by
"collocation" regulations which require local telephone companies to
allow CAPs to locate facilities in ("physical" collocation) or near
("virtual" collocation) the telephone company switching office, thus
avoiding the transport charge that would otherwise apply for the carriage of calls between the switching office and the CAP facilities.
524. New York is one of the leading states in the nation in this regard.
525. To provide a sense of the size of an "intraLATA calling" area, New York City,
Long Island, and much of Westchester comprise a single LATA. Some states comprise a single LATA; California, on the other hand, contains eleven LATAs.
526. AT&T's, for example, is 10288.

527. See, e.g., Opinion and Order Concerning Intra-LATA Presubscription, Case
28425, Opinion No. 94-11 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 4, 1994) (stating that customers should be able to presubscribe to carriers for their intraLATA toll calls);
Opinion and Order Concerning Intra-LATA Presubscription, Case 28425, Opinion
No. 93-12 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 13, 1993) (same).
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4. Local Exchange Services
The New York Public Service Commission, and regulatory agencies
in other states, have recently authorized certified companies to provide competitive local exchange service-that is, the basic "dial tone,"
or connection between the customer and a local switching office. Local exchange competitors generally offer a range of local and longdistance calling services together with the basic exchange access
hookup.
5.

Changes in the Traditional Model

Questions involving competitive entry into the local telephone market remain hotly debated. In general, competitors complain that regulators have not moved fast enough in removing claimed barriers to
entry, while incumbent local companies argue that they should not
remain bound by regulatory restraints that do not apply to new entrants, on the grounds that such differential regulation creates a nonlevel competitive playing field. In any event, regulatory initiatives
aimed at opening local markets to competition have also focused attention on the question of whether any changes are warranted in the
way incumbent local exchange companies are regulated.
Some of the debate has focused on the continuing viability of the
line-of-business restrictions of the MFJ. Competitors argue that these
restrictions are necessary to prevent anticompetitive conduct by
RBOCs; the RBOCs, on the other hand, argue that market conditions
have changed so radically since divestiture that the restraints are no
longer warranted, and that the remaining restraints impose severe
competitive handicaps. For example, as a result of the interexchange
restriction, RBOCs cannot offer "one-stop-shopping" for local and
long distance services, as IXCs now can; nor can they offer volume
discounts on combined local and long distance usage. A number of
RBOCs have petitioned the court that entered the MFJ (the United
States District Court for the District of the District of Columbia,
Judge Harold Greene) for relief from various line of business
restrictions.528
Another focus of attention has been restraints on telephone company provision of video services. Although telephone companies do
provide services for the transportof video programming generated by
others, unlike cable companies, they are not allowed to participate in
the origination or selection of such programming in their telephone
528. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Request of NYNEX Corp. for a Waiver
to Provide Interexchange Servs. in New York, United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
Civ. No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 1994) (seeking a waiver of MFJ restrictions in the
state of New York).

790
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service areas. This is partly a consequence of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.529 Section 533(b)(1) of that Act states that:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in
part to subchapter II of [the Cable Communications Act of 1934] to
provide video programming directly to subscribers in its telephone
service area, either directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned
by, operated by,530
controlled by, or under common control with the
common carrier.
Courts in a number of pending lawsuits have ruled that the video programming prohibition is an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of
speech.531
Finally, state regulators are beginning to review the desirability of
continuing traditional "rate of return" regulation of local telephone
company-provided services, and are considering whether to implement alternative "price cap," "incentive regulation," and "performance regulation" plans that may give such companies greater market
flexibility.
II.

ACCOMODATING UNIVERSAL SERVICE CONCERNS

An important and unresolved issue remains the impact of competition on the traditional goal of universal service. Naturally, competitors will first seek to enter markets where prices significantly exceed
costs; generally speaking, these are the markets for the provision of
long- and medium-distance calling services to business, and the provision of carrier access service to IXCs. As noted above, however, the
"contribution" generated by those services helps keep the prices of a
number of other services at relatively low levels; this, in turn, is
thought to advance the goal of universal service. As competition begins to erode the revenues that those services generate, the question
arises whether rates for basic residence access service can be maintained at their traditionally low levels.
Several solutions are being explored in different states. Some
states, such as California, have allowed incumbent telephone companies to lower their rates for the contributory services to levels that
529. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
530. Id. § 533(b)(1) (emphasis added). The FCC has construed the term "common
carrier," as used in this provision, to refer to traditional "dominant" local exchange
companies, but not, for example, to IXCs.
A related cross-ownership restriction makes it unlawful for a common carrier "to
provide channels of communications ... to any entity which is directly or indirectly
owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with such common
carrier, if such facilities or arrangements are to be used for, or in connection with, the
provision of video programming directly to subscribers in the telephone service area
of the common carrier." Id. § 533(b)(2); 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(b) (1994).
531. See, e.g., US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that under First Amendment scrutiny, § 533(b) fails the narrowly tailored
requirement), petitionfor cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3160 (U.S. Aug. 23, 1995).
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better reflect competitive realities, and to raise the rates for basic exchange access service.532 The premise of these regulatory changes is
that universal service will not seriously be compromised by modest
increases in local exchange access rates. Other states are experimenting with alternative regulation plans in which telephone companies agree to maintain basic service rates at their current levels in
exchange for an increased degree of regulatory flexibility.5 33 Some
jurisdictions are considering special "high cost fund" arrangements in
which telephone companies operating in high-cost areas could become
eligible for subsidies from other carriers. 5 Finally, some states are
considering the establishment of "universal service funds," to which
all providers of intrastate telecommunications services would be required to contribute, and that would be used to support low rates for
certain services.535 Which of these measures will prove best suited to
conditions in particular areas remains uncertain.
As long as universal service remains a goal of telecommunications
regulators, a variety of thorny issues will have to be resolved. Many of
these are currently under consideration in a pending proceeding
before the New York State Public Service Commission.
These issues also received detailed consideration from the Senate and House
in connection with comprehensive telecommunications legislation that
was considered, but not enacted, by the 103d Congress, as well as in
connection with legislation being considered by the current
Congress.537
As noted above, the key threshold issue is to identify the specific
services that warrant universal service-type safeguards. Among the
criteria that may be relevant to such a determination are the necessity
of the service (e.g., emergency 911 service probably has a greater
claim to universal service protections than Call Waiting), and whether
normal market mechanisms (combined with available social service
mechanisms) are sufficient to ensure the continuing availability of the
service in question. Presumably, both criteria would have to be met
532. See Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, No. 9409-065, 1994 Cal. PUC LEXIS 681, at *55-59 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 15,1994).
533. One such plan is the "Performance Regulation Plan," recently approved for
New York Telephone Company. See Opinion and Order Concerning Performance
Regulatory Plan, Case 92-C-0665, Opinion No. 95-13 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Aug.
16, 1995).

534. The New York Public Service Commission has been considering such an option. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine Issues Related to the
Continuing Provision of Universal Service and to Develop a Regulatory Framework
for the Transition to Competition in the Local Exchange Market, Case 94-C-0095
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Transition to Competition
Proceeding].
535. See id.
536. Id at 8.
537. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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before a service could be considered truly "basic" for universal service
purposes. 538 The cost of providing the service may also be relevant.
It should also be kept in mind that the list of "protected" services
may well change over time, either through changes in the level of "necessity" of particular services or else through the creation or correction of market failures. For example, market forces may drive the
price of basic voice grade telephone service to a level where regulation could not conceivably be viewed as necessary to preserve its universal availability. In such a case, the "market failure" test would not
be met for that service. Conversely, the systems society uses for the
delivery of education and medical care may conceivably change so
radically in the future that certain broadband services would come to
be considered as necessities. If this occurs, and if the market failure
criterion is met, such services could be considered for inclusion in the
universal service package.
Once a list of "protected" services is identified, the next question is
how to ensure that those services are physically available in all parts
of the country. In general, of course, the market will make services
available wherever cost and demand ensure that they can be provided
at a profit. The question remains of how unprofitable areas will be
provided with such services, if they are deemed necessary.
Historically, incumbent local exchange carriers have been expected
to make basic services available to all customers within their defined
service territories, whether or not it would be economically attractive
to do so at current rates. This role is sometimes referred to as the
"carrier of last resort." As the provision of local telephone service
becomes increasingly competitive, questions arise as to whether there
should be more than one "carrier of last resort" in any particular area,
how such carriers should be chosen, and whether and how they should
be compensated for filling the "carrier of last resort" role.
The pricing of "protected" services remains perhaps the most difficult issue. As noted above, historically, regulators have sought to
maintain basic residence local exchange access rates at low levels for
all customers. Many have questioned whether that approach should
be continued, or whether the general rate level should be raised, with
low-income customers protected either through direct subsidy payments, vouchers, or special "Lifeline" discounted service offerings.
To the extent that low prices are deemed desirable for certain services, the question arises as to how those prices can be maintained.
538. For example, food is clearly necessary, yet food distribution is not subject to
any special "universal service" regulatory framework; presumably, this is because
market mechanisms, combined with such special assistance programs as food stamps,
are deemed adequate to ensure the universal availability of adequate nutrition. On
the other hand, to whatever extent the market has or has not achieved 100% market
penetration of videocassette recorders, it would be hard to view that product as a
"necessary" one.

1995]

INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

793

Requiring the prices of other services to be maintained at artificially
high levels creates economic inefficiencies, and tax funding may in
many cases be politically infeasible. A middle alternative that has
been considered is the creation of universal service funds supported
by providers of telecommunications services.5 39 If such a fund is to be
created, further questions arise as to what level of funding would be
appropriate, how the funding obligation would be allocated among
the entities supporting the fund, and how the fund would be allocated
to beneficiaries.
CONCLUSION

These are difficult issues, but regulatory bodies and market participants are beginning to give them more detailed consideration. Within
the next year, a body of precedent should emerge which will provide
useful guidance for the resolution of universal service issues in the
context of the NIL.

539. Even here, the question arises as to who should be required to contribute to
such funds. To the extent that the funds are established and maintained by regulatory
bodies, jurisdictional considerations may limit participants to regulated entities. The
benefits of universal service, however, extend beyond such firms.

